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I. INTRODUCTION
IN THE LAST few decades, European equality law seems to have entered a coming-of-age stage. The principle of equal treatment in its various forms and guises, refined through legislative developments and judicial interpretation by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU)and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), has 
become a core element of the European normative sphere, both as an individual non-
discrimination right under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and as a 
foundational component of European Union (EU) law and policy. Arguably the most sig-
nificant feature of this transformative process is the gradual repositioning of the meaning 
of equality towards more substantive lines. The reference to full equality in Protocol 12 of 
the ECHR and Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
is an eloquent, albeit tacit, admission that existing inequalities cannot be adequately 
redressed through a formulaic and neutral principle1 that creates primarily negative and 
minimally positive obligations.2 
1 On the relationship between formal equality and state neutrality, see A Gutman, Liberal Equality (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1980); M Sandell, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1982). 
2 Under the Convention system, Article 14 has been associated with positive obligations for the fi rst time at 
the dawn of the new century in the case of Thlimmenos v Greece (2001) 31 EHRR 411 (see below, section III.B). 
In the subsequent case of Stec (Stec and others v UK, Grand Chamber, 12 April 2006, ECHR 2006-VI) the ECtHR 
explicitly acknowledged that ‘in certain circumstances a failure to attempt to correct inequality through different 
treatment may in itself give rise to a breach of the article’ ([51]). A similar development has taken place within 
the framework of EU law, with ‘fourth generation’ equality duties introduced through secondary law instru-
ments based on what was then Article 13 TEC in the Treaty of Amsterdam (now Article 19 TFEU). See B Hepple, 
M Coussey, and T Choudhury, Equality: A New Framework: Report of the Independent Review of the Enforcement 
of UK Anti-Discrimination Legislation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000); S Fredman, ‘Equality: A New Generation?’ 
(2001) 30 Industrial Law Journal 145, 163 et seq. 
* Lecturer in Law, University of Portsmouth. The author wishes to thank Vassilis Tzevelekos, Hugh Collins, 
Lizzie Barmes, Mark Bell and the participants in the November 2012 workshop on the EU Accession to the ECHR 
(University of Maastricht) for valuable comments on various iterations of this chapter. The usual disclaimer 
applies.
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Despite these developments, the discourse on equality remains convoluted and fraught 
with doctrinal inconsistencies.3 Formal equality continues to cast its shadow over anti-
discrimination mechanisms designed to achieve concrete results, and terms like positive 
action, reasonable accommodation and special treatment are often seen as interchangeable 
exceptions to equal treatment. The accession of the EU to the ECHR provides a unique 
opportunity to rethink the concept of equality and its modus operandi in the European 
normative space and to identify a singular, coherent and philosophically robust general 
legal principle of equal treatment for the whole Civis Europeus.4 With the ambition to make 
a small contribution to the wider debate, this chapter will attempt to shed some light on 
facets of the equality discourse that lack analytical clarity. 
Instead of adopting the orthodox approach that views equality as oscillating between 
competing models, the analysis will challenge the philosophical integrity of formal equal-
ity as a distinct category of normative significance. Section II of this chapter, then, will 
endeavour to deconstruct formal equality, explain why it is an unfit philosophical premise 
for European anti-discrimination law and identify the ‘substantive’ turn in the case law of 
the two European courts. It will be argued that, despite the tentative emergence of a new 
paradigm of full equality, conceptual confusion continues to be part of the picture, espe-
cially insofar as the relationship between positive action and equal treatment is concerned. 
Section III therefore will discuss positive action as a key index of full equality and will use 
it as the backdrop against which to clarify the place of reasonable accommodation and 
forms of special treatment to vulnerable social groups. Section IV will turn to assess the 
possible impact of EU accession to the Convention on European equality law. Although EU 
equality law is obviously broader in scope and inevitably more sophisticated than a system 
built around a single Convention Article, accession can still become the driver for greater 
conceptual clarity and interpretative convergence. Section V concludes.
A final note on methodological choices is in order. Despite the fact that the discussion 
is not confined to any one protected ground or human characteristic, several arguments 
are designed to target gender equality in particular. This emphasis on gender is the most 
suitable means of exploring the differences between positive action, reasonable accom-
modation and special treatment. A similar caveat applies to the almost exclusive focus of 
that part of the enquiry on EU law, as the relevant mechanisms have drawn less attention 
within the context of the Convention. This notwithstanding, the claims advanced here are 
intended to cover the whole spectrum of European equality law in its broadest sense, with 
gender equality used as a proxy to develop a more general analytical framework. 
3 On the conceptual complexity underlying European equality and non-discrimination law in general, see 
C McCrudden and S Prechal, The Concepts of Equality and Non-discrimination in Europe: A Practical Approach, 
Report by the European Network of Legal Experts in the Field of Gender Equality (European Commission, 
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, November 2009). For remarkable 
attempts to work through the doctrinal inconsistencies, see C McCrudden and H Kountouros, ‘Human Rights 
and European Equality Law’ in H Meenan (ed), Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union: Understanding the 
Article 13 Directives (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007); O De Schutter, ‘Three Models of Equality 
and European Anti-discrimination Law’ (2006) 57 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 1. 
4 Joined Cases C-132/91, C-138/91 and C-139/91 Katsikas v Konstantinidis [1992] ECR I-06577, Opinion of 
AG Jacobs [46].
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II. THE MAGICAL (SUR)REALISM OF FORMAL EQUALITY5
Formal equality is one of the most cited and, arguably, ill-treated terms in the equality 
discourse. Liberal moral and political philosophy has claimed paternity of the term early 
on, attributing it to Aristotle, who is, in turn, often labelled an ex post facto unsuspecting 
recruit to the liberal cause.6 The famous ‘treating likes alike’ maxim7 has consistently been 
thought to constitute a foundational principle of liberal justice, underpinning the general 
legal principle of equal treatment in its various national constitutional endorsements.8 
It is no surprise that this particular notion of equality remains at the epicentre of liberal 
thinking, as it is a good fit for a normative framework predicated on state neutrality9 and 
the primacy of the individual.10 Classical formal equality therefore usually translates into a 
general prohibition of discrimination involving primarily negative obligations, which may 
be coupled with minimal regulatory intervention horizontally when necessary to ensure a 
degree of gender neutrality in the private sphere. 
This line of analysis was long thought to be mirrored by the rationale underpinning 
the prohibition of discrimination under the ECHR system, with the state obligation stem-
ming from Article 14 ECHR accordingly understood as primarily a negative one. For quite 
some time, part of the theory asserted that Strasbourg case law was11 reflective of ‘a clear 
preference for formal equality’,12 in line with the ‘treating likes alike’ Aristotelian maxim.13 
In this context, Article 14 of the Convention was used as a tool to ensure that individuals 
in similar situations received the same treatment by the respondent state.14 In recent years, 
however, a number of commentators have identified a shift in the Strasbourg Court’s 
conceptualisation of equality under the Convention15 from a formal to a more substantive 
  5 On magic realism as an artistic category and a literary genre, see W Spindler, ‘Magic Realism: A Typology’ 
(1993) 22 Forum for Modern Language Studies 75. As will hopefully become apparent in the course of this section, 
formal equality shares a conceptual affi nity with magic realism in that it introduces surreal elements—namely 
the assumption that individuals or groups can be treated as starting from the same position—in an otherwise 
realistic normative environment. 
  6 SG Salkever, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1990). 
  7 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Athens, Papyrus, 1975) V.3. 1131a10–b15; Aristotle, Politics (Athens, Papyrus, 
1975) III.9.1280 a8–15, III. 12. 1282b18–23. 
 8 Most post-Renaissance national constitutions include some form of a general equality clause among their 
provisions. The same is true of most international legal texts on the protection of human rights, in which case, 
however, the provision often appears in the form of a general non-discrimination clause. 
  9 See, for instance, A Gutman, Liberal Equality (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980); M Sandell, 
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982).
10 See, among others, W Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990).
11 At least up until the late 1990s. See K Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: 
Individual Human Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 
2000) 59 and 76.
12 G Tarr, RF Williams and J Marco (eds), Federalism, Subnational Constitutions and Minority Rights (Westport, 
Praeger, 2004) 31.
13 OM Arnardóttir, Equality and Non-discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights (Leiden, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2002) 10; T Loenen, ‘Rethinking Sex Equality as a Human Right’ (1994) 12 Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 253.
14 Fredin v Sweden (No 1), Series A No 192 (1991) [60]; Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v Portugal (1999) 31 EHRR 
47 [26]; Edoardo Palumbo v Italy, App No 15919/89 (ECtHR, 30 November 2000) [51]. 
15 Part of the literature has identifi ed a similar shift from formal to substantive equality in the positive action 
case law of the CJEU, which will be explored in more detail later on. 
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notion.16 Accepting difference as an intrinsic element of the equal treatment rationale is 
thought to be the key in this alleged reconceptualisation, with the Court’s ruling in the 
seemingly inconspicuous case of Thlimmenos v Greece17 often viewed as a turning point. 
In Thlimmenos, the Court, for the first time in almost half a century’s worth of judgments, 
moves to explicitly suggest that: ‘The right not to be discriminated against in the enjoy-
ment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is also violated when States without 
an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are 
significantly different.’18
Despite what may appear to some as a revolutionary change of tack in Strasbourg’s 
approach to equality, the Thlimmenos ruling does not constitute a theoretical leap away 
from formal equality. A closer look at Nicomachean Ethics should be more than enough 
to shatter such simplistic assumptions. The laconic maxim ‘treating likes alike’ only tells 
half of the story on equality as Aristotle intended it. If similar situations are to be treated 
according to the same norm, it is only logical that, by extrapolation, different situations 
call for different normative treatment. This is nothing more than a concrete expression of 
a general rule of rationality,19 although it is not always clear that ‘equality as rationality’20 
is understood as including an obligation for differentiated treatment.21 In Aristotle’s own 
words, ‘this is the origin of quarrels and complaints—when either equals have or are 
awarded unequal shares, or unequals equal shares’ because if two persons are not equals, 
‘they should not be entitled to enjoy equal shares’.22 Similarity and difference, then, are 
complementary criteria in determining the appropriate normative content of equal treat-
ment and the CJEU has been quicker than its Strasbourg counterpart in explicitly recognis-
ing this as the correct interpretation of EU gender equality legislation.23 
Reasonable as it may sound, such an interpretation of formal equality leaves a lot 
to be desired in terms of conceptual integrity and theoretical robustness. Accepting differ-
ence as an intrinsic element of formal equality blurs the conceptual boundaries between 
formal and substantive equality insofar as the former is traditionally understood as a 
strict principle of consistency in the treatment of similar cases24 embodying a notion of 
procedural justice.25 In other words, by removing absolute gender neutrality26 from the 
definitional content of formal equality, gender is no longer automatically classified as a 
16 S Spiliopoulou-Akerman, ‘The Limits of Pluralism—Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights with Regard to Minorities: Does the Prohibition of Discrimination Add Anything?’ (2002) 3 
Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 5; R O’Connell, ‘Commentary—Substantive Equality in the 
European Court of Human Rights?’ (2009) Michigan Law Review First Impressions 107, 129.
17 Thlimmenos v Greece (2001) 31 EHRR 411.
18 Ibid [44], emphasis added.
19 I Berlin, ‘Equality as an Ideal’ in FA Olafson (ed), Justice and Social Policy: A Collection of Essays (Englewood 
Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1961).
20 C McCrudden, ‘Chapter 11: Equality and Non-discrimination’ in D Feldman (ed), English Public Law 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) 581, 582. 
21 From the point of view of English public law, for instance, McCrudden’s analysis (ibid 614) seems to implic-
itly accept that equality as rationality entails both types of obligation, but he nonetheless refrains from exploring 
the nature, scope and limits of the obligation for differentiated treatment in any detail. 
22 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics (n 7). 
23 Case 106/83 Sermide SpA v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero [1984] ECR 4209 [28]; Opinion of AG Van Gerven, 15 
September 1993, Case C-146/91 Koinopraxia Enoseon Georgikon Synetairismon Diacheiriseos Enchorion Proionton 
Syn PE (KYPED) v Commission [1994] ECR I-4199. 
24 C Barnard and B Hepple, ‘Substantive Equality’ (2000) 59 Cambridge Law Journal 562.
25 Ibid 563.
26 Or neutrality on any other protected ground for that matter. 
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morally  irrelevant characteristic27 and it is therefore possible to suggest that the conceptual 
 distance between formal and substantive conceptions of equality is significantly dimin-
ished. Effectively, then, the legitimacy of differentiated treatment under such a conception 
of formal equality would inevitably move from a normative to a factual level of enquiry, 
with a view to determining whether gender in that particular context is a factor that places 
men and women in relatively different situations. What counts as a normatively significant 
factual difference will remain, of course, a matter of interpretation and, arguably, consider-
able disagreement. The same is true a fortiori with regard to the actual content of the treat-
ment afforded to individuals or groups in different positions, as factual differences per se 
will not automatically justify every deviation from the ‘standard’. The point, however, is that 
such a conception of formal equality is not incompatible in principle and by default with 
any form of differentiated or even special treatment, up to and including positive action, 
as long as it can be justified in concreto. 
The lack of conceptual clarity that is associated with formal equality has often led to 
terminological discrepancies and analytical confusion in the field of EU equality law. One 
of the most famous examples is to be found in the reactions to the CJEU’s early ruling on 
positive action in the Kalanke case.28 Although Kalanke is, indeed, a rather weak specimen 
of legal reasoning and rightfully attracted fierce academic criticism at the time,29 there is no 
consensus in the literature on whether the fault lies in the CJEU’s commitment to formal 
equality30 or in its ‘narrow and procedural approach to equality of opportunities’,31 which 
is generally considered to fall within the broad spectrum of substantive equality.32 It is quite 
telling that this interpretative divergence exists even though EU gender equality law was, in 
theory, explicitly predicated on a conception of equality of opportunities rather than formal 
equality ever since the adoption of the original Equal Treatment Directive.33
Far from indulging purely philosophical musings on the meaning of equality, this line of 
enquiry is laden with practical normative significance. It begs the question whether there 
is any room left within the combined normative framework of EU law and the ECHR 
for a conception of formal equality in the classical liberal sense, which may resonate with 
the ensuing state obligations and still be sufficiently distinguishable from rival notions of 
equality. In other words, is it possible to conceive of formal equality as a sufficiently defined 
self-standing notion that does not collapse into a ‘less substantive’ variant of substantive 
equality? Although any answer would not be fully convincing outside the framework of a 
27 J Nickel, ‘Discrimination and Morally Relevant Characteristics’ (1972) 32 Analysis 113.
28 Case C-450/93 Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] ECR I-3051.
29 A Peters, ‘The Many Meanings of Equality and Positive Action in Favour of Women under European 
Community Law—A Conceptual Analysis’ (1996) 2 European Law Journal 177; S Prechal, ‘Case C-450/93, Kalanke v 
Freie Hansestadt Bremen, [1995] ECR I-3051’ (1996) 33 Common Market Law Review 1245; E Szyszczak, ‘Positive 
Action after Kalanke’ (1996) 59 MLR 876.
30 See, among others, M De Vos, ‘Beyond Formal Equality: Positive Action under Directives 2000/43 EC 
and 2000/78 EC’ (2007) European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities 22.
31 Barnard and Hepple (n 24) 577.
32 S Fredman, A Critical Review of the Concept of Equality in UK Anti-discrimination Law: Independent Review 
of the Enforcement of UK Anti-discrimination Legislation (Cambridge, Cambridge Centre for Public Law and Judge 
Institute of Management Studies, 1999) Working Paper No 3, para 3.12. 
33 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treat-
ment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions.
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robust European theory of equality,34 it is possible to offer some preliminary suggestions 
in this direction. If disengaged from its alleged intellectual progeny, a liberal conception of 
formal equality can still make sense in a non-comparative context.35 If one accepts that the 
allocation and enjoyment of certain rights is entirely independent of situational differences, 
it seems reasonable to suggest that the distinction between morally relevant and morally 
irrelevant characteristics is not applicable and, consequently, equal protection of the law in 
this context renders interpersonal comparisons redundant, if not outright unlawful. 
The natural normative environment wherein such a conception of equality—tenta-
tively termed here non-comparative formal equality—is intuitively resonant is the realm of 
absolute rights. Take, for instance, the right not to be tortured or subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment.36 This is generally accepted as a ‘peremptory norm of jus cogens’37 
in international law—and recognised as such under the ECHR38—which is not subject to 
degrees, limitations or restrictions of any kind. Over the years, Strasbourg has been careful 
to safeguard the absolute nature of the prohibition by firmly denying the legitimacy of all 
attempts to justify state policies and practices through reference to elements of comparison 
in any shape or form. Torture is prohibited irrespective of the circumstances of the victim’s 
conduct39 and it does not lend itself to a balancing act between competing rights40 or 
between the risk of harm to the victim and the danger he poses to the state.41 
One might be tempted to extrapolate and suggest that, in the case of absolute rights, equal 
treatment is automatically tantamount to (gender) neutrality. Even if that were correct,42 
however, the category of non-comparative formal equality would continue to suffer from 
the philosophical thinness attributed to its traditional liberal version. If the obligation to 
treat equally is exhausted by treating everyone identically solely by virtue of our shared 
‘humanity’,43 then equality becomes a normatively redundant concept44 as it collapses into 
nothing more than a prohibition of direct discrimination.45 In fact, according to part of 
the literature, it would make more sense to remove equality and discrimination altogether 
34 Which, inevitably, goes far beyond the limited scope and ambitions of the present enquiry. 
35 It is often suggested that the fi rst part of the Aristotelian maxim corresponds to formal equality, whereas 
its second part is refl ective of substantive equality. See L Waddington and A Hendriks, ‘The Expanding Concept 
of Employment and Discrimination in Europe: From Direct and Indirect Discrimination to Reasonable 
Accommodation Discrimination’ (2002) 18 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations 403, 2.1. This line of argument, however, is premised on the traditional but erroneous assumption that 
it is possible to conceptually decouple formal from substantive equality simply by reference to the similarity/
difference dichotomy. 
36 Article 3 ECHR.
37 Prosecutor v Furundzija (10 December 1998), ICTY, Case No IT-95-17/I-T (1999) 38 International Legal 
Materials 317 [144]. 
38 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, ECHR 2001-XI (2001) [61]. 
39 Lorse v The Netherlands, App No 52750/99 (ECtHR, 4 February 2003). 
40 Chahal v United Kingdom, EHRR 1996-V (1996).
41 Saadi v Italy, App No 37201/06 (ECtHR, 28 February 2008). 
42 Which is not necessarily the case, as the lack of consensus on the matter indicates. 
43 B Williams, ‘The Idea of Equality’ in P Laslett and WG Runciman (eds), Philosophy, Politics and Society 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1962).
44 P Westen, ‘The Empty Idea of Equality’ (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 537. 
45 It goes without saying that any conception of equality that fails to recognise indirect discrimination as an 
intrinsic defi nitional element of the prohibition of discrimination is by default too narrow to encapsulate the 
current normative framework of European equality law. See, among others, E Ellis, EU Anti-Discrimination Law 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005); S Besson, ‘Evolutions on Non-discrimination Law within the ECHR and 
ESC Systems: It Takes Two to Tango in the Council of Europe’ (2012) 60 American Journal of Comparative Law 147. 
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from this kind of normative equation,46 as the morally reprehensible and legally prohibited 
act par excellence in this case is the violation of the absolute right itself. Simply put, when 
torture is at issue, the gender of the victim47 should be morally and legally irrelevant. 
This line of argument may be correct in exposing the logical incoherence of formal 
equality in any of its conceptual guises, but it fails to capture the essence of the philosophi-
cal problem and is clearly at odds with the normative reality of European equality law. The 
Strasbourg Court has often considered the merits of complaints alleging a violation of 
Article 3 in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, where torture was thought to be 
the result of discrimination.48 In its reasoning, the Court identified that racially motivated 
torture was ‘a particular affront to human dignity’.49 The corresponding state obligation, 
then, is interpreted as requiring ‘authorities [to] use all available means to combat racism 
and racist violence, thereby reinforcing democracy’s vision of a society in which diversity is 
not perceived as a threat but as a source of its enrichment’.50 Transposed into the context of 
gender, this echoes feminist critiques of jus cogens as being reflective of a male perspective 
that permeates international human rights law51 and uses the public/private dichotomy52 
as a mechanism to obfuscate the role that gender equality should play in the relevant philo-
sophical discourse and corresponding normative framework.53 
With the Strasbourg Court apparently in tune with those arguing in favour of the need 
to incorporate an equality dimension even in the interpretation of absolute rights, it seems 
that there is hardly any room left for a conception of formal equality predicated on absolute 
neutrality. This rings even more true in the context of EU law, where gender mainstreaming 
has been introduced with the explicit aim of rendering gender equality an integral con-
sideration across the spectrum of the whole normative agenda since the late 1990s.54 The 
‘symmetrical’ approach that formal equality is seen as encapsulating55 may have enjoyed 
some currency in the not-so-distant past, but it is losing its legal and political lustre in the 
European normative space. 
This notwithstanding, the relevant discourse continues to oscillate between the ‘formal’ 
and the ‘substantive’ that are seen as occupying opposite ends of the equality spectrum. It 
is the dichotomy itself, then, that lies at the heart of the philosophical problem. The mis-
take of recognising formal equality as the conceptual altera pars of substantive equality is 
not rectified by accepting the latter as the preferred interpretation of equal treatment. The 
46 J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986) ch 9.
47 Or any other characteristic that may constitute a ground for discrimination. 
48 Nachova and others v Bulgaria (2005) ECHR 2005-VII; Bekos and Koutropoulos v Greece (2005) ECHR 
2005-XIII; Stoica v Romania, App No 42722/02 (ECtHR, 4 March 2008); Virabyan v Armenia, App No 40094/05 
(ECtHR, 2 October 2012). All these cases involve an allegation of torture as a result of racial rather than gender 
discrimination, but the argument regarding the relationship between equal treatment and absolute rights holds 
true vis-a-vis all grounds of discrimination. 
49 Virabyan v Armenia (n 48) [199], emphasis added. 
50 Ibid.
51 H Charlesworth and C Chinkin, ‘The Gender of Jus Cogens’ (1993) 15 Human Rights Quarterly 63, 67.
52 Ibid 72.
53 H Charlesworth, C Chinkin and C Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’ (1991) 85 American 
Journal of International Law 613, 624.
54 C Boothand and C Bennett, ‘Gender Mainstreaming in the European Union’ (2002) 9 European Journal of 
Women’s Studies 430; MA Pollack and E Hafner-Burton, ‘Mainstreaming Gender in the European Union’ (2000) 
7 Journal of European Public Policy 432.
55 S Fredman, ‘After Kalanke and Marschall: Affi rming Affi rmative Action’ (1999) 1 Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 199, 200.
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thrust of the analytical claim advanced here is that the concept of equality is singular and 
should not be fragmented into binary schemas. Simply put, the modus operandi of equal 
treatment as a general legal principle requires that personal circumstances are always a core 
element of the reasoning, even if only to ascertain the absence of any normatively signifi-
cant differences. As explained earlier, if this is true even for absolute rights, then it should 
be true a fortiori with regard to every other type of right. If this line of analysis is correct, 
it begs the question whether the notion of formal equality should be abandoned altogether. 
Part of the theory has attempted to offer a less radical solution by striking a conceptual 
compromise. Besson, for instance, explains that the different dimensions of equality may 
give rise to multiple binary dichotomies, such as between symmetrical and asymmetrical 
equality and between formal and material equality.56 According to this schema, sym-
metrical equality amounts to both treating comparable situations similarly and different 
situations differently, with asymmetrical equality covering cases where special treatment is 
required.57 Besson seems to argue that both symmetrical and asymmetrical equality can be 
accommodated under a conception of formal equality, but then goes on to acknowledge 
that the latter does not always amount to material equality due to the effects of past dis-
crimination. In these cases, positive action becomes a legitimate means to bridge the gap 
between formal and material equality.58
Although this approach leaves a lot to be desired in terms of conceptual clarity, it does 
help identify a significant problem with the equality discourse. This is none other than 
the conflation between special treatment and positive action, which are often seen both 
in the EU and in the ECHR contexts as interchangeable deviations from the norm of for-
mal equality. Besson’s analysis offers some useful insights into why only special treatment 
should be regarded as asymmetrical, but rests firmly rooted in the assumption that formal 
equality is the norm. It follows that any move towards a substantive paradigm of equality is 
virtually impossible without a clearer image of where special treatment and positive action 
fit into the normative picture. 
III. CONCEPTS AND CONCEPTUAL BOUNDARIES: POSITIVE 
ACTION, REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION, SPECIAL 
TREATMENT AND SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
A.  Clarifying the Concept: A Typology of Positive Action 
and the Interpretative Status Quo in EU Law 
According to a moderate, comprehensive and relatively non-controversial definition, posi-
tive action denotes the deliberate use of race or gender-conscious criteria for the specific 
purpose of benefiting a group that has previously been disadvantaged or excluded from 
important areas of the public sphere on the grounds of race or gender respectively.59 Two 
important points regarding the notion of group employed here become immediately 
56 S Besson, ‘Gender Discrimination under EU and ECHR Law: Never Shall the Twain Meet?’ (2008) 8 Human 
Rights Law Review 647, 673.
57 Ibid 674–75.
58 Ibid 675–76.
59 S Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002) 126.
The New European Paradigm of Full Equality 299
obvious. First, any category of persons that have been or are being discriminated against 
on grounds of a shared characteristic should, in principle, be entitled to claim the status 
of a social group for the purposes of positive action.60 In other words, there appears to 
be nothing in the definition of positive action to suggest that its use should be limited to 
particular social groups.61 Second, the benefiting groups may be either disadvantaged or 
under-represented as a result of the invidious use of the shared characteristic. The relation-
ship, however, between disadvantage and under-representation is severely under-theorised, 
which undermines doctrinal clarity and threatens normative consistency. 
In the EU law jargon, positive action is an ‘umbrella’ term that is understood in a deliber-
ately open-ended manner, so that it can potentially encompass a wide range of equality and 
non-discrimination policies and practices. Although there is no terminological consensus 
in the literature,62 the view that positive action can take a number of different shapes or 
forms became the default position early on.63 It is obvious that this lack of conceptual spec-
ificity obfuscates the relevant discourse and creates unnecessary confusion. Distinguishing, 
then, between different types of positive action should be an analytical priority in order 
to lay down success standards and accurately assess the effectiveness of such measures in 
achieving the aim of ‘full equality in practice’.64 
The most successful recent attempt to provide a comprehensive typology of positive 
action in employment has been undertaken by De Schutter,65 Who identifies six types of 
positive measures in employment:66 
— ‘Monitoring the composition of the workforce in order to identify instances of under-
representation and, possibly, to encourage the adoption of action plans and the setting 
of targets’ (type 1).
— ‘Redefining the standard criterion on the basis of which employment or promotion 
are allocated (in general, merit)’ (type 2).
— ‘Outreach measures, consisting in general measures targeting underrepresented groups, 
such as the provision of training aimed at members of the underrepresented groups or 
job announcements encouraging members of such groups to apply’ (type 3).
— ‘Outreach measures, consisting in individual measures such as the guarantee to 
members of underrepresented groups that they will be interviewed if they possess the 
relevant qualifications’ (type 4).
— ‘Preferential treatment of equally qualified members of the underrepresented group, 
with or without exemption clause (also referred to as “flexible quotas”)’ (type 5).
— ‘Strict quotas, linked or not to objective factors beyond the representation of the target 
group in the general active population’ (type 6). 
60 On a very signifi cant discussion on the normative construction of the concept of social group, see IM Young, 
Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990) 42–48; IM Young, ‘Polity and 
Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’ (1989) 99 Ethics 250.
61 This is, indeed, the rationale behind the ongoing expansion of the scope of anti-discrimination law towards 
a more inclusive approach. Besides race and gender, other human characteristics, such as age, ethnicity, disability 
and sexual orientation, have been gradually added to the list of protected grounds of discrimination. Note, for 
instance, the phrasing of Article 14 ECHR and of Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the Convention. 
62 See Fredman (n 59) 125–36.
63 See, among others, C McCrudden, ‘Rethinking Positive Action’ (1986) 15 Industrial Law Journal 219.
64 Article 157(4) TFEU.
65 O De Schutter, ‘Positive Action’ in D Schiek, L Waddington and M Bell (eds), Cases, Materials and Text on 
National, Supranational and International Non-discrimination Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007).
66 Ibid 762.
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De Schutter’s typology is meticulous and covers a wide range of measures and schemes. In 
essence, though, it is premised upon a simpler binary distinction. On the one hand, there 
are ‘true positive measures’ that involve some form of preferential treatment to members 
of the disadvantaged groups and, on the other hand, ‘outreach measures’ that aim primar-
ily at improving the competitiveness of the group in the labour market without granting 
preferential treatment. According to this criterion,67 measures of types 4, 5 and 6 fall under 
the former category, while measures of types 1, 2 and 3 fall under the latter.68 
Turning from theory to practice—and bearing in mind that a detailed examination of 
the CJEU case law on positive action lies beyond the limited scope of the present enquiry—
it can be safely argued that the legitimacy of soft measures under EU law is currently 
beyond doubt. The legality of strict measures, on the other hand, depends on whether they 
satisfy the test the CJEU laid down in its Badeck ruling.69 According to the three-pronged 
Badeck test, the measure must:
— be designed to address a de facto inequality between men and women in employ-
ment;
— be flexible with regard to the achievement of desired results, so that the allocation of 
the benefit is not automatic; 
— contain a saving clause, so that the allocation of the benefit is not unconditional.
The Court explicitly or implicitly refers to each of these criteria in all of the judgments70 
and all three must be satisfied if the measure is to pass the Court’s scrutiny successfully. 
A final note on the position of the CJEU on positive action is necessary here. Although 
Badeck provoked a surge of enthusiasm at the time from pro-equality lawyers and theorists 
who regarded it as evidence of a shift from formal to substantive equality,71 its alleged 
radicalism has been significantly overplayed. The Court in Badeck refined the test that was 
already introduced in its previous Marschall ruling72 in order to adapt it to the require-
ments of former Article 141(4) (now Article 157(2) TFEU),73 but, in reality, the link from 
the severely criticised Kalanke to Marschall to Badeck remained unbroken.74 Badeck con-
firms that ‘soft’ quotas are permissible in principle and maybe proved that Member States 
could feel confident that carefully designed positive action schemes will survive the scru-
tiny of the Court. Nevertheless, the Court was not really faced with a hard case: if positive 
67 De Schutter argues that there is a second criterion according to which positive measures can be classifi ed into 
two categories, namely whether they require that the benefi ciary is a member of the (disadvantaged) target group. 
Although it is true that, in certain cases, non-members can take advantage of a programme designed primarily for 
the benefi t of a specifi c group, it is submitted that this is a direct consequence of the principle of equal treatment 
understood as full and effective equality. 
68 De Schutter (n 65) 762.
69 Case C-158/97 Badeck v Landesanwalt beim Staatsgerichtshof des Landes Hessen [1999] ECR I-1875.
70 Case C-366/99 Griesmar v Ministre de l’Economie [2001] ECR I-9383; Case C-476/99 Lommers v Minister van 
Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [2002] ECR I-2891; Case C-319/03 Briheche (Serge) v Ministère de l’intérieur, 
de la securité intérieure et des libertés locales [2004] ECR I-8807. Specifi cally, on the fi rst criterion, see para 46 in 
Griesmar, para 41 in Lommers and para 22 in Briheche; on the second criterion, see para 56 in Griesmar, para 43 
in Lommers and para 23 in Briheche; and on the third criterion, see para 57 in Griesmar, para 45 in Lommers and 
para 23 in Briheche. 
71 N Burrows and M Robinson, ‘Positive Action for Women in Employment: Time to Align with Europe?’ 
(2006) 33 Journal of Law and Society 24.
72 Case C-409/95 Marschall v Land Nordrhein Westfalen [1997] ECR I-6363. 
73 The Marschall test was tailored to the original Equal Treatment Directive.
74 This link is cleverly characterised by Fredman as an ‘individualistic straitjacket’. See Fredman (n 55) 390.
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action is a contentious issue that calls for elaborate theoretical exercises in legal reasoning, 
Badeck was a let-off.75 As with Marschall, the Badeck quota would pass the threshold of 
legality even against the theoretical backdrop of a less substantive notion of equality. 
The explicit reference to substantive equality, then, as a legitimate state objective may be 
welcome, but its implications are symbolic rather than normative. Accepting the legitimacy 
of selection criteria that ‘are manifestly intended to lead to an equality which is substantive 
rather than formal’76 is not enough to guarantee anything more than the abandonment 
of strict or non-comparative formal equality. This, however, begs the question whether 
Badeck had anything to add to our existing understanding of the concepts involved, given 
that the rejection of ‘strict’ formal equality can be directly inferred from Article 157(4) 
TFEU without the need to engage in a rigorous interpretative process. Even more signifi-
cantly, the formal/substantive equality dichotomy continues to underpin the legal reason-
ing, which in itself undermines the robustness of the concept of equality at play. 
B.  Clarifying Conceptual Boundaries (I): Positive Action v 
Reasonable Accommodation
Disability discrimination in employment is one of the most rapidly developing areas of 
anti-discrimination law in Europe. This is in no small part due to the Framework Equality 
Directive77 that imposed on Member States an obligation to implement anti-discrimina-
tion measures for the protection of disabled persons in employment.78 In Article 5 the 
Directive introduces the notion of reasonable accommodation, which is intended to occupy 
centre-stage in eliminating discrimination on grounds of disability. The positive duty79 of 
reasonable accommodation entails that employers should take ad hoc measures ‘to enable 
a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment, or to 
undergo training’.80 The Directive, then, purports to achieve a double aim: first, to establish 
75 The Badeck scheme involved public service rules that gave priority to women in promotions, access to 
training and recruitment. Such priority, however, was neither automatic nor unconditional: it was only allowed 
in sectors of the public service where women were under-represented, when the female candidate was equally 
qualifi ed to her male counterpart and only if no reasons ‘of greater legal weight’ that might tilt the balance in 
favour of the male candidate were put forward. According to the German government, these reasons ‘of greater 
legal weight’ concerned ‘various rules of law … which make no reference to sex and are often described as social 
aspects’ (Badeck (n 69) [34]). The Badeck positive action system amounted to what is usually described as a ‘fl ex-
ible result quota’. In para 28 of the ruling, the Court itself attributed two main characteristics to this system: it 
does not ‘determine quotas uniformly for all the sectors and departments concerned’ and it ‘does not necessarily 
determine from the outset—automatically—that the outcome of each selection procedure must, in a stalemate 
situation where the candidates have equal qualifi cations, necessarily favour the woman candidate’.
76 Badeck (n 69) [32].
77 Directive 2000/78/EC.
78 A Lawson and C Gooding, ‘Introduction’ in A Lawson and C Gooding (eds), Disability Rights in Europe: 
From Theory to Practice (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005) 1.
79 Fredman (n 59) 59.
80 Article 5 of Directive 2000/78/EC reads as follows: ‘In order to guarantee compliance with the principle of 
equal treatment in relation to persons with disabilities, reasonable accommodation shall be provided. This means 
that employers shall take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to enable a person with a dis-
ability to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment, or to undergo training, unless such measures 
would impose a disproportionate burden on the employer. This burden shall not be disproportionate when it 
is suffi ciently remedied by measures existing within the framework of the disability policy of the Member State 
concerned.’
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reasonable accommodation as a general norm that applies to all employers in the public 
and private sectors; and, second, to affirm that the absence of it amounts in and of itself to 
discrimination.81 
Domestic legislation in most Member States has also adopted the approach taken in 
the Directive. A characteristic example is the UK Disability Discrimination Act 1995, as 
amended in 2005, which introduces the term ‘reasonable adjustments’ as equivalent to 
reasonable accommodation.82 As Fredman points out, through the notion of reasonable 
adjustments, the Act does not simply require employers to conform to the ‘able-bodied 
norm’, but to modify that norm with a view to ‘afford[ing] genuine equality to disabled 
persons’.83 The language of the Directive and of the domestic implementing provisions 
echoes the traditional formal/substantive equality dichotomy, with commentators keen to 
suggest that the obligations in question are clearly inspired by a conception of substantive 
equality. 
It is exactly this perceived adherence to substantive equality that led some commentators 
to regard reasonable accommodation as a form of positive action,84 although not neces-
sarily as ‘reverse or positive discrimination’.85 Such an interpretation, however, is errone-
ous and has been rightfully contested,86 as it confuses two substantively and procedurally 
distinct normative techniques.87 Reasonable accommodation should be conceived of as ‘a 
particular kind of non-discrimination legislative provision, related to, but not synonymous 
with, the established forms of direct and indirect discrimination’.88 It is thus an instrument 
designed according to the ‘difference model of discrimination’, which is in turn premised 
on an ‘asymmetric notion’ of equality.89 In other words, the recognition that disabled 
persons are in a substantially different situation from able-bodied persons entails that the 
equal treatment principle in this case requires different treatment of the respective groups.
From this point of view, it is evident why reasonable accommodation does not amount 
to positive action. Whether or not disabled persons can be classified as a disadvantaged 
or under-represented group in particular employment cadres is irrelevant. Reasonable 
accommodation is thus understood as possessing an ‘individualised character’,90 contrary 
81 United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, ‘The Concept of Reasonable 
Accommodation in Selected National Disability Legislation’, 2005, available at www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/
rights/ahc7bkgrndra.htm. 
82 For a more detailed analysis of the UK Disability Discrimination Act and its interpretation by national 
courts, see C Gooding, ‘Disability Discrimination Act: From Statute to Practice’(2000) Critical Social Policy 533. 
83 Fredman (n 59) 59.
84 See, for instance, H Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (London, Cavendish Publishing, 2002) 
1043.
85 B Doyle, ‘Enabling Legislation or Dissembling Law? The Disability Discrimination Act 1995’ (1997) 60 
MLR 64, 74. In the US context, see BP Tucker, ‘The ADA’s Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights 
Paradigm’(2001) 62 Ohio State Law Journal 335, 365.
86 And not only in the European discourse. For a discussion of the matter from a US point of view, see C Jolls, 
‘Antidiscrimination and Accommodation’ (2001) 115 Harvard Law Review 642.
87 L Waddington, ’Reasonable Accommodation’ in D Schiek, L Waddington and M Bell (eds), Cases, Materials 
and Text on National, Supranational and International Non-discrimination Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) 
745.
88 DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, International Perspectives on Positive Action 
Measures: A Comparative Analysis in the European Union, Canada, the United States and South Africa (European 
Commission Publications Offi ce, 2009) 27, emphasis added.
89 Ibid. See also Fredman (n 59) 126–30, especially 128–29.
90 DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (n 88) 28.
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to the group approach that is instrumental in the conceptualisation and operation of 
 positive action. Admittedly, the boundaries between the two are not always clear in prac-
tice. Systems that introduce a disability quota, requiring that a minimum percentage of the 
workforce should consist of disabled persons, as is the case in France, Austria and Sweden,91 
go beyond reasonable accommodation and into the realm of positive action. This, however, 
does not undermine the doctrinal distinctiveness of the two concepts.
Although the Commission’s interpretation of reasonable accommodation is generally 
correct, one cannot help but notice the echoes of the traditional formal/substantive equal-
ity dichotomy. Insofar as the official language of equality remains entrapped in this paro-
chial analytical schema, a return to a formalistic conception of equality as nothing more 
than due process remains theoretically possible, even if unlikely. 
C.  Clarifying Conceptual Boundaries (II): Gender Equality 
between Disadvantage and Vulnerability
The practical impact of EU gender equality law has been seriously contested from a feminist 
perspective both at the early stages of its development92 and even after the recent additions 
to the normative framework.93 Most commentators recognise the contributions of new 
legislation and of the policy and governance tools that have been employed, such as gender 
mainstreaming,94 in improving the socio-economic status of European women, especially 
during the last decade.95 Significant gender inequalities across the spectrum, however, con-
tinue to exist despite the efforts of European institutions and national legislators. 
For some, this is the inevitable result of a general institutional mentality that ‘condemns’ 
EU social policy to the back seat in a primarily market-oriented policy agenda.96 In femi-
nist writings, however, the problem lies primarily with the conception of equality at play, 
which fails to recognise and adequately structural disadvantage.97 This is particularly evi-
dent in the case of pregnancy and the way in which the CJEU has interpreted the relevant 
legal provisions. 
McGlynn, for instance, accuses the Court for adopting the ‘dominant ideology of 
motherhood’98 across its case law on gender equality. Although its motives may be benign, 
the aim of addressing structural discrimination against women is only superficially 
served. If traditional assumptions about the socially constructed role of women are not 
91 Ibid 29.
92 S Fredman, ‘European Community Discrimination Law: A Critique’ (1992) 21 Industrial Law Journal 119.
93 A Masselot, ‘The State of Gender Equality Law in the European Union’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal 152.
94 F Beveridge, ‘Building against the Past: The Impact of Mainstreaming on EU Gender Law and Policy’ 
(2007) 32 European Law Review 193; J Shaw, ‘Mainstreaming Equality and Diversity in European Union Law 
and Policy’ (2005) 58 Current Legal Problems 255. See, however, a more sceptical view in F Beveridge and S Nott, 
‘Mainstreaming: A Case for Optimism and Cynicism’ (2002) 10 Feminist Legal Studies 299.
95 For an overview of the disadvantaged status of women across the EU at the end of the twentieth century, see 
A Glasner, ‘Gender and Europe: Cultural and Structural Impediments to Change’ in J Bailey (ed), Social Europe 
(London, Longman, 1998).
96 S Prechal, ‘Equality of Treatment, Non-discrimination and Social Policy: Achievements in Three Themes’ 
(2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 533, 533.
97 Fredman (n 92) 134. 
98 C McGlynn, ‘Ideologies of Motherhood in European Community Sex Equality Law’ (2000) 6 European Law 
Journal 29, 31–32.
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shattered, then under-representation of women in positions of power near the top of the 
 socio-political hierarchy will continue to mar any superficial success of equality strategies.99 
But what McGlynn goes on to suggest is far more radical than that. In her view, the 
underlying problem is that EU gender equality law revolves around a ‘paternalistic 
“protection” principle’100 that overrides equal treatment. In other words, the ‘rhetoric of 
protection’101 that presents women as a vulnerable social group is itself at fault for the per-
petuation of vulnerability.102 If this is true for pregnancy-related legislation,103 then it is 
true a fortiori for positive action. The echoes of the typical social stigma argument are loud 
and clear.104 It would be redundant to rehearse the full set of counter-arguments, especially 
in view of the fact that the real point here seems to be more refined compared to its classical 
formulation in the US literature. 
To do justice to this critique, one needs to move beyond the feminist reluctance of label-
ling women as vulnerable and understand the thrust of the argument in the following 
terms: women should be treated as a vulnerable group in need of special protection only 
when they are actually vulnerable because of attributes specific to their gender.105 When 
they are disadvantaged because of their gender, on the other hand—that is, because of the 
simple fact that they are women—the matter should be dealt with as a case of direct or 
indirect gender discrimination. Eradicating disadvantage that stems from discrimination 
or from gender-biased normative perceptions does not qualify as special protection, even 
though it may require ‘asymmetric’ legal tools such as positive action. 
Distinguishing between vulnerable groups and disadvantaged groups is no easy task in 
practice, but it is normatively significant. It is a necessary condition to understand positive 
action as an expression of equal treatment and not as a form of special treatment as in its 
classical conception. Disadvantaged groups, then, are entitled to positive action,106 whereas 
vulnerable groups are entitled to the special benefits provided for in general policies that 
promote social inclusion,107 according to the basic ideals of the welfare state. 
This latter dichotomy between positive action and general welfarist or social inclu-
sion policies is clearly and coherently presented in the recent Report on Positive Action 
of the European Commission.108 Drawing insights from the Report, one can also make 
sense of the further distinction between disadvantaged and vulnerable groups introduced 
here. Children, for instance, constitute an emblematic and arguably uncontested case of a 
  99 On the normative attitudes towards women, see generally Fredman (n 32).
100 McGlynn (n 98) 35.
101 Ibid.
102 The argument here is not a distinctly feminist one, in the sense that it applies equally to other disadvantaged 
or under-represented social groups.
103 J Conaghan, ‘Pregnancy and the Workplace: A Question of Strategy?’ (1993) 20 Journal of Law and Society 
71, 82–83.
104 For a recent empirical analysis of the argument in its racial dimension, see A Onwuachi-Willig, E Houh 
and M Campbell, ‘Cracking the Egg: Which Came First—Stigma or Affi rmative Action?’ (2008) 96 California Law 
Review 1299.
105 These attributes are not necessarily—if at all—biological. The argument here refers primarily to social 
attributes that may render women a vulnerable group in a specifi c social context. Women of a particular ethnic 
or religious background, for instance, may be subjected to cultural or religious rituals, without their consent, as a 
matter of custom or religious doctrine. In this case the external perception of gender imposes additional burdens 
on women that need to be taken into account when allocating legal protection. 
106 Or, in any case, can become legitimate target groups for positive action programmes.
107 On social inclusion as the principal goal of anti-discrimination law, see H Collins, ‘Discrimination, 
Equality, and Social Inclusion’ (2003) 66 MLR 16.
108 DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (n 88) 28.
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vulnerable social group. They are thus allocated special protection exactly because of their 
perceived vulnerability, without this violating the general principle of equal treatment.109 
Free education for young persons is a good example of such special protection.110 As 
cogently pointed out in the Report, the fact that free education is only available for this 
particular age group does not entail that the education system is ‘an age-related form of 
positive action’.111
Admittedly in some cases there will be inevitable overlap, as disadvantage and vulner-
ability may appear as concomitant elements of the social condition of the same group. 
Ethnic minority children, for instance, are not simply a vulnerable group but may addition-
ally suffer from disadvantage related to their ethnic origin. In this case, it may be neces-
sary to supplement the ‘standard’ protection reserved for children in general with positive 
measures specifically designed to cancel out the effects of the additional disadvantage this 
particular group of children is burdened with. 
IV. TOWARDS A COMMON EUROPEAN CONCEPTION OF FULL EQUALITY: 
EU ACCESSION TO THE ECHR AS AN OPPORTUNITY? 
It would be premature, if not outright erroneous, to suggest that the EU’s accession to the 
Convention would have an automatic impact on the conceptualisation of equal treatment 
in general and of gender equality in particular. After all, the act of accession in and of itself 
is, in actual fact, little more than an official proclamation of an already-acknowledged sym-
biotic relationship between the two systems. It is, however, reasonable to predict that such 
a move is likely to produce effects that go above and beyond mere institutional symbol-
ism. Although Luxembourg and Strasbourg are generally keen to avoid a head-on conflict, 
the convergence in their interpretations of equal treatment is neither absolute nor always 
consistent.112 Part of the problem lies with the apparent reluctance of the two European 
courts to provide a systematic theoretical account of their respective anti-discrimination 
regimes,113 which, admittedly, would be a rather difficult task without an underlying 
theoretical account of equality. The EU’s accession to the Convention may, indeed, provide 
the opportunity for an alignment of both normative theory and judicial practice with the 
emerging European paradigm of full equality.114 
By the same token, however, accession in and of itself is extremely unlikely to resolve 
the conceptual inconsistencies identified throughout this analysis. Despite the fact that 
both European courts appear to be moving away from strict formal equality, EU equality 
law is considerably more developed and sophisticated than the Convention system in this 
regard. All three substantive dimensions of equal treatment—positive action, reasonable 
accommodation and special treatment—have a concrete textual basis in secondary EU law, 
coupled with the interpretative scrutiny of the CJEU. The ECtHR, on the other hand, may 
have found it more difficult to translate the non-discrimination guarantee of Article 14 
109 It is interesting to note that this is true under any conception of equal treatment, even under the formal/
substantive dichotomy.
110 DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (n 88) 28.
111 Ibid.
112 Besson (n 56).
113 Ibid 651.
114 According to the Preamble to Protocol 12 ECHR and to the equivalent phrasing of Article 157(4) TFEU.
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and Protocol 12 into a coherent and full-fledged principle of full equality, but it also seems 
more willing to make a tentative leap in that direction.  
In Runkee,115 for instance, the ECtHR opens up a new path to full equality, but seems 
reluctant to follow it through. The Court indirectly confirms that positive action can 
be a legitimate means to redress factual inequalities insofar as the specific measures are 
proportionate116 and finds that reserving the widowers’ benefits to female widows until 
2001 could be objectively and reasonably justified.117 More importantly, it goes so far as 
to suggest that ‘in certain circumstances a failure to attempt to correct inequality through 
different treatment may in itself give rise to a breach of the article’.118 Hinting that signa-
tory parties may be under a positive obligation to introduce positive action is a far more 
progressive stance on equality than the CJEU has ever attempted to entertain and fits well 
with the full equality paradigm. At the same time, however, the Court does not appear to 
have any problem with the UK government’s policy choice ‘to bring about equality through 
“levelling down”’.119 Combined with a wide margin of appreciation ‘usually allowed under 
the Convention when it comes to general measures of economic or social strategy’,120 this 
approach effectively eliminates the possibility of imposing any meaningful positive obliga-
tion on national legislators. Once again then, the problem seems to lie first and foremost 
in the lack of conceptual integrity that makes it impossible to gauge what the true meaning 
of full equality is. 
A relatively more coherent attitude emerges in Konstantin Markin, where the Grand 
Chamber chastises the Russian government for misconceiving positive action,121 despite 
failing to explain that the misconception lies in the conflation of positive action and 
special treatment. The case involved a national rule stipulating that only female military 
personnel would be entitled to three years of parental leave. Although the Court is cor-
rect to dismiss the ‘special biological link’ argument122 as inapplicable to the three-year 
period following childbirth,123 it still goes on to consider the possibility that women have 
a ‘special role’ in bringing up children.124 Distinguishing between childbirth and upbring-
ing echoes the CJEU’s approach in Griesmar125 and also reflects the way in which positive 
action and special treatment are distinct equality mechanisms. Reserving parental leave for 
female personnel only is not intended to correct the disadvantaged position of women in 
that employment area and, as such, it cannot qualify as a positive action measure.126 On 
the other hand, Strasbourg observes that ‘contemporary European societies have moved 
towards a more equal sharing between men and women of responsibility for the upbring-
ing of their children’.127 This emerging European consensus makes it difficult to justify 
115 Runkee and White v United Kingdom, App No 42949/98 and 53134/99 (ECtHR, 10 May 2007). 
116 Ibid [35]. 
117 Ibid [40].
118 Ibid [35].
119 Ibid [41].
120 Ibid [36].
121 Konstantin Markin v Russia, App No 30078/06 (ECtHR, 22 March 2012) [141].
122 Ibid [116].
123 Ibid [132].
124 Ibid [139]–[140].
125 Griesmar v Ministre de l’Economie. In Konstantin Markin, the ECtHR examined Griesmar in detail in 
[65]–[66]. 
126 Konstantin Markin v Russia (n 121) [141].
127 Ibid [140].
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the national rule in question as special treatment, especially since it seems to perpetuate 
stereotypes about traditional gender roles.128 
Although the Court’s reasoning in Konstantin Markin is generally beyond reproach, the 
thrust of the matter remains that this ‘clean’ picture of the Convention system has little, if 
anything, to contribute to current EU equality law. The latter is broader, more sophisticated 
and nuanced to the extent that one would naturally expect Strasbourg to be mostly at the 
receiving end of any fruitful judicial dialogue. The only meaningful effect of EU accession 
would be to produce a direct link between the notion of full equality and a positive obliga-
tion to address existing gender inequalities through any means available, including positive 
action. Strasbourg is better placed to entrench and defend such a substantive conception 
of equality, as it claims to maintain the coveted position of a neutral arbiter that moves 
forward only after European consensus has been achieved. The CJEU, on the other hand, 
is bound to tread more lightly in view of its limited human rights mandate and in the face 
of a precarious political balance within the EU. As things stand at the moment, however, 
there is little evidence that Strasbourg is willing to take the pole position in this respect and 
dictate the terms of a genuinely common European paradigm of full equality. 
V. CONCLUSION
The story of European equality law so far is one of continuous evolution and qualified suc-
cess. It is impossible to deny that a number of equality indexes have noticeably improved 
across European societies in the last few decades. The lion’s share of the credit rightfully 
belongs to Strasbourg and Luxembourg for gradually developing a mature understand-
ing of equal treatment that goes beyond the narrow confines of formalism. This is also 
reflected in a tentative shift in the law towards an emerging paradigm of full equality, 
intended to reconcile normative intentions with social reality. At the heart of this trans-
formative process is the recognition that formal equality fails to account for and redress 
endemic inequalities stemming from past and present discrimination. Such recognition, 
however, remains partial and half-hearted. Despite rhetorical declarations to the contrary, 
the two European courts seem generally reluctant to commit to the new equality para-
digm unequivocally and pursue its legal consequences to their full extent. Formal equality 
continues to be treated not as a dead concept, but rather as a valid—albeit not always pre-
ferred—alternative interpretation of equality. On the same token, the blurred conceptual 
boundaries between distinct anti-discrimination mechanisms and the conflation between 
positive action and special treatment make it difficult to envisage what the proper meaning 
of a common European conception of equality really is. 
The possible accession of the EU to the Convention system may provide the impetus to 
instil much-needed clarity into the normative picture. The first step in this direction will be 
an explicit abandonment of formalism that eschews normatively  significant  situational dif-
ferences between individuals or groups and makes unrealistic assumptions about past and 
present social realities. The combined interpretative efforts of the two European courts, 
coupled with academic scholarship, can translate the European vision for full equality into 
a coherent analytical framework, wherein positive action, reasonable accommodation and 
128 Ibid [127], [139], [142] and [143].
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special protection of vulnerable groups will feature as affirmations of genuine equality of 
treatment. The second and more decisive step, however, will depend on the willingness 
of Strasbourg to use the language of positive obligations in its Article 14 and Protocol 12 
jurisprudence. If the paradigm of full equality is to have any substantial impact on policy 
making, it must be seen as generating concrete state responsibilities. There is hardly any-
thing novel, let alone revolutionary, about the suggestion that European states have an obli-
gation, both under the Convention and as a matter of EU law, to address social inequalities 
through appropriate means. Holding states liable for failure to act upon positive equality 
obligations is clearly within Strasbourg’s mandate, but it is admittedly a precarious politi-
cal move, likely to attract severe criticisms of unwarranted judicial activism on the part of 
the ECtHR. Post-accession, however, the reinforced position of the Strasbourg Court, with 
the support of its Luxembourg counterpart, should be enough to guarantee that the leap 
towards full equality has every chance of succeeding. 
